Secure Communications
| Online resource | Comments | Level of Message Security | See |
|---|---|---|---|
| both sides using smart phones | secret chat available | https://ssd.eff.org | |
| (FB) | either side using computer | no end-to-end encryption | |
| Warning | |||
| Keybase | mobile phones and desktop PCs | Uses PGP | https://keybase.io/ |
| Line | end-to-end encryption | Evaluation|Warning | |
| no end-to-end encryption | See discussion | ||
| Meest | end-to-end but see note. | Somewhat less secure | |
| Quora | no end-to-end encryption | * | |
| Session | Like Signal, but no phone needed | end-to-end encryption. | Evaluation |
| Signal. | Only available via smartphone | end-to-end encryption | Evaluation |
| Snapchat | Evaluation | ||
| Tails | Complete Linux OS on your PC | ultra-secure;possession 😟 | Tails_Details |
| Telegram | end-to-end encryption. | Problems | |
| Threema | Works on iPads & smartphones | end-to-end encryption | Evaluation |
| Quora | no end-to-end encryption | * | |
| Only available via smartphone | end-to-end encryption | Evaluation | |
| Wire | Multiple platforms | end-to-end encryption | Thorough review |
It may be desirable to register for some services using a “burnable” email address. For suggestions, see: https://restoreprivacy.com/email/temporary-disposable/
An attempt to Unsnarl TOR and related security issues.
For a good discussion of security on social media, see https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/end-to-end-encryption-julya-ziablitseva/
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists has a good discussion of the various ways that people desiring to leak information to them may do so with relative safety. See https://www.icij.org/leak/
Communication modalities for resistance forces.
https://www.starlinkhardware.com/category/information/
Would a mesh network be useful for secure communications in Afghanistan? See:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bridgefy
and
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-13/mesh-networks-could-replace-ukraine-s-damaged-cell-service
Communication modalities for resistance forces.
There is a piece of software called “Tails” that can be installed on a USB drive. After it gets properly configured, you can restart your computer, select “Tails” as your start-up drive, and then your computer operates entirely from the USB drive. When you shut down your computer and disconnect the USB drive, you will find that the USB drive retains no records pertaining to what it was last used for.If you do a web search for “How to use “tails” you will find several videos about this product.]
Wikipedia records that US security organizations have issued warnings about the potential misuses of this system for illegal actions. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tails_(operating_system)
The use of TOR is not a perfect solution, but those with extreme security situations should learn about it. See: TOR and Tails
https://lifehacker.com/browse-like-bond-use-any-computer-without-leaving-a-tr-5916551
Running an instance of Ubuntu on your computer's CD drive or using a USB drive would let you work without leaving any trace of your actions on the computer. The user of this modality would not get flagged by Taliban for using TOR technology. However, unless you were using a good VPN your communications would still trace back to the point at which you went on-line.
See: https://www.techtarget.com/searchdatacenter/definition/Debian
Another kind of software is called Ricochet Refresh. It is a messenger that goes through TOR. I have tried to experiment with it. It is notably lacking in on-line tutorial stuff. Here are some things I found out. Hints on getting Ricochet Refresh up and running.
For the future, and also because this site gives good overbite on how https: works to keep communications cryptic from when things leave your computer to when they enter the other guy's computer, see Quantum Cryptography Is On The Way